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We investigate two-player contribution games that are similar to the ones studied by Compte and Jehiel [2003]but different in that our games are played in incomplete information environments. We show
that, under certainconditions, there exists a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which step-by-step contributions are realized along the
equilibrium path. This gradual accumulation of contributions is not observed in Compte and Jehiel's equilibrium
in complete information environments. Our  result indicates that uncertainties about valuations of the opponentplayers can be a source of such gradualism.
1. Introduction
Bargaining and contribution games have been studied in various aspects in the literature. The seminal
work by Rubinstein [1982]shows that subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in bargaining problems
converge to Nash bargaining solutions [Nash,  1950]as players become more patient. In Rubinstein'sbargaining models, payments are assumed to occur after players reach an agreement. So,
 payments arenot sunk in the bargaining process
。
Admati and Perry [1991]have investigated what if payments for a joint project are sunk in voluntary
contribution games. They show that there e χists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which payments aremade in small steps along the equilibrium path. Such gradual accumulation of payments is referred toas gradualism.
  Their result of gradualism is obtained under the assumptions that a cost function forthe project is arbitrarily
 convex and valuations for the project are the same between two players. Theyhave suggested that the sunk character of contributions is
 a source  of the gradualism 。
Revisiting Admati and Perry's  contribution game, Compte and Jehiel [2003]have pointed outthat
 their result of gradualism depends on the convexity of the cost function  and the symmetry of
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the valuations. Compte  and Jehiel have introduced a linear cost function  and asymmetric valuationsinto Admati and Perry's contribution game, and show that there exists a
unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium,  in which at most two large  contributions are realized.    So, the gradualism observed inAdmati
 and Perry [1991]  has disappeared due to the linear cost function and the asymmetric valuations.In
 the proof of Compte and Jehiel's result けhey heavily use the assumption under complete informationenvironments: Each player knows the other player's valuation for the project
。
In the present paper, we investigate what if uncertainties about valuations are introduced into
Compte and Jehiel's model. In  our  model けhere  is a chance  for each player to be either a high valuationtype or a low valuation type. Each player is informed of his own valuation but
not of his opponent's
valuation: He just knows the prior probability of his opponent being a high type. We show that,  if thisprior probability
is below a certain upper bound^ for both players, and if they are sufficiently patient,
then there e χists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which step-by-step contributions are realized.
A few studies in the literature have been seeking after sources of gradualism, which seems to be
observed in real-life contribution processes. Conipte and Jehiel [2004]identify that outside options in
a negotiation phase can be a source of gradualism. Lockwood and Thomas [2002]present a model that
exhibits gradualism due to irreversibilities of levels of cooperations. In the present paper, uncertainties
about valuations of the opponent players are a source of gradualism 。
The idea of introducing elements of uncertainties into bargaining models is not new in the litera-
ture. Abreu and Gul [2000]and Compte and Jehiel [2002]consider models in which players might not
be rational but obstinate and inflexible with soine probability. Marx and Matthews [2000]consider a
model of voluntary contributions in which players do not observe individual contributions but an ag-
gregate level of contributions in each period. The present paper attempts another way of incorporating
uncertainties into a model 。
The  remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 explains  a  iでno del of two-player contribution games under
incomplete information. Section 3 proves that there e χists a perfectBayesian equilibrium in which gradualism is
observed under certain conditions.    Section 4 providessome concluding remarks.
iThis upper bound can be arbitrarily close to one if the difference between the valuations of a high type and
a low type becomes sufficiently small.
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2. The Model
We investigate two-player voluntary contribution games similar to the ones studied by Compte and
Jehiel[2003] 。
Two agents, agents l and 2, are the players of the game. They contribute alternately to complete
a project, which costs  K  ＞0.  Upon an immediate completion of the project, agent i obtains a benefit
呪，which is called agent i's valuation for the project. At the beginning of the game, the nature decideswhether each agent i's valuation is a high value H
 or a low value L,  that is, 柘 ∈{ 爪 口whereH
 ＞L ＞0.  So, agent i's valuation Vi  also represents his type: Agent i with Vi  ＝H  ＼8 a high  type andagent i
with 呪 ＝L  is a low  type. Let  Pi ∈(0,1)denote the prior  probability that  Vi ＝H  is drawn bythe nature.
 We assume that Pi  and  乃are independent. Furthermore,  we assume that Pi and 几arecommon knowledge while
the realized value of Vi  is known only to agent i 。
The game is played in periods  i ＝1,2, ‥ 。, where agent l moves in periods with odd numbers whileagent 2 moves in periods with
 even numbers until the project is completed. Let m(t) denote the moverin period t,
 that  is, m(t)  =  1 if t is a positive odd number while m(t)  =  2 if t is a positive even number.Let
 c＼≧O denote the  amount of contribution by agent i in period t. Since two agents take turns inmaking contributions, 
べ ＝0  if i ≠m(t): This constraint on (c ＼，ci)together with c? ＝c り＝0 fornotational convenience is
called the feasibility for (べ，ぺ).At the end of period t, (c ＼，c＼)is observedby both agents. Let
x' -- 瓦
t
－Σ( 可 十 司)T
 =0
be the remaining amount  necessary for completion of the project at the end of period t.    Note thatx
° =K  a.nd (x°,x＼x^,
‥.)is a non-increasing sequence. When the remaining amount reaches 0, theproject is completed and the game ends. Let
 T  denote the period  of completion of the project, that is, Tis the least
 natural number that satisfies the condition JT ≦0.1f the project is not coinpleted foreverdue to an insufficient amount of contributions, then we let T
 ＝oo.　We assume that contributionsare non-refundable
 even  if the project is not completed. So,  contributions become sunk costs for eachagent.
Let  が ＝(a; °,ノ.  . ．ぶ*^M)denote a history at the beginning of period t.     Agent  i's behaviorstrategy Si
 is a function that specifies a probability distribution over contribution  amounts for each typeof
 i and for each history: s( 貼, が)is the probability of choosing c* given  Vi and  が ＝(x °, ジ … ，x－̂')with x*
‾i ＞0.^ By the feasibility for (ci, ぺ),we require that Si(O ＼Vi,h*)＝l[ii ≠7n(i).
2For the definitions of strategies and belief functions, we require that x£－i ＞0 because otherwise, the gamemust have ended before period t.
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On reaching a history が ＝(x °,x＼‥.,x^ ‾'^)with x'－' ＞0,  agent i holds  a belief pd が)，whichrepresents the probability that
agent i assigns to the event where his opponent is a high type given h ＼We
call Pi agent  i's belieソfunction.  Given the common  prior (Pi, P2), we assume that pi( が) ＝ 巧andP2(
か) ＝Pi.
Both agents discount benefits and contributions using  a discount factor  5 e (0,1). When agent i'stype is 
‰his payoff for  a contribution  sequence c ＝{( ふ ぺ)爪o is given by
T
に(‰c) ＝ダ ‾凩 －Σ がt=0-^ ぺ
We  assume  that agents ma χimize eχpected payoffs. Let  Ui(s＼Vi,が,p)be the expected  payoff  of agent iwith type U
under a strategy profile s on condition that  he reaches a  history  がand a belief profilep(
が) ＝(pi( が),p2( が))is given 。
We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. We follow Fudenberg and Tirole [1991a,  1991b]for the definition of
the equilibria. In the present model,  a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium  (s,p)is a pairof a strategy profile s 
＝(si,  S2)and a belief function profile p =  (Pi,)2)that satisfies  the following twoconditions.
Sequential Rationality.For all が,i  ＝m(t),  j ≠i,  柘，and  砿wehaveUi(s ＼Vi, が,p) ≧Ui(( 砿Sj)|Vi,h ＼p)Reasonabil
雨/. Bayes'  rule is used to update beliefs whenever possible: For alH, ノ≠ 亀h'  ＝(x °,… ，丿 一')and




where X* =  £'‾ ̂－(c ＼ ＋c ＼)＞0.
We note that the reasonability condition does not impose any constraint on agent i's belief  Pi ((が, ノ))if
妁(貼H 丿) ＝sj( ぐ ＼L,が) ＝0. That is,  if it is agent J's move at がand ifj chooses c]  that shouldhave zero probability for both types
of j according to Sj,  then agent i's belief at が＋  ̂＝( がx')can becompletely arbitrary
・
The  remaining part of this section presents a comparison of Compte and Jehiel's result and ours.
Example 1 (Compte and Jehiel's  result).  Consider a game with χ 一 120, 耳　100,  L　90,and
 5 ＝0.9.   Let agent l be a low type and agent 2 be a high type without any uncertainty.　Inthis complete information
 environment, an appropriate equilibrium concept is that of subgame-perfect
皿2
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equilibria.'^ In the game, there eχists a unique subgame-p  erfect equilibrium, in which agent l contributesonly 20 while agent 2 contributes as much as 100, that
is, c＼ ＝20 and d ＝100.
E χample 2 （Our result ）.  Consider a game with K  ＝120,  H  ＝100,  L  ＝90,  and  S ＝0.9.  LetPi
 =  0.01 and 乃 ＝0.9,  that is, agent l is a low type with 99 per cent certainty  and agent 2 is ahigh type with 90 per
cent certainty. In the game, there e χist many perfect Bayesian equilibria. Inone equilibrium, both agents contribute the same amount 60, that is, c
＼ ＝60 and d ＝60.  In
 anotherequilibrium, both agents contribute
the  same amount in total but payments are made in  small steps:c
＼＝c? ＝30 and d ＝4  ＝30.
The  comparison shows that without any uncertainty,  an  unfair cost-sharing pattern is realized, butwith some uncertainty,




We  assume  that K く2L.    Take any contribution  sequence  {(砿 べ)}乙o satisfying the feasibility and
一　　　　　　　　　　　　　　－
the following conditions:　 べ ＞0  if 2 ＝m(t), Σ こ 詞 く £for all i, and Σ 乙( ぺ 十 べ)=  K.  Define a
一　　　　　　　　　　一　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　－
history  ド ＋  ̂＝(x °,ダ ，…,  x^)corresponding to {( 砿 ぺ)}乙o. Since  (c* 十 帽 ＞O for Z =  1,2,‥・,r,
一　　　　－
we have 尺 ＝io ＞ ダ ＞ ‥・＞x^ －  ̂＞x'^  =  0. Let  Pi e  (0,1)be given for i ＝1,2.
Theorem. // P,  ＜2L/(H 十L)  for all i and  5 ∈(0,1)is sufficiently large,仇,en there exists a
－
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (s,p)in which the historyび キ^ is realized along the equilibrium path.
－




T  =  t
尺　 く　 £ 十δ柘　for alH and for all l/; ，
－　　　　　　一
八 丿1












ぷ'－゛G　 ＞　 ぷ''(/i 一 句　for alH, for all /i, and for all  t =  1,2,…,  T,     and      (3)
－
T一




Lemma 1.  ifSe[O ］is sufficiently large,  then 6 satisfies  the conditions  (1) ／4) ・




Proof ・.The right hand side (RHS,  henceforth)of the inequality (1)converges to £ 十Vi  as  S converges
－
to 1. Since  K  ＜2L,  the condition (1)holds for large 5.
As  5  converges to 1, RHS of the inequality (2)converges to 2L/(H 十L).  Since  八 ＜2 £/(H 十 柏
－
for alii by the assumption of the theorem, the condition (2)holds for large 5.
As for the inequality (3),  we consider the left  hand side (LHS,  henceforth)subtracted by RHS. As
－
5  converges to 1, (LHS － RHS )converges to
－T






which is strictly positive since Σf=i  べ ＜ £by the choice of  {(べ，C2)}乙o.So,  the  condition  (3)holds
－
for large 5.
To investigate the condition (4),  we consider two cases.    First, suppose that  t ＝T  and  ごぎ ＝0where j
≠i.　In this case, LHS of the weak inequality (4)can  be rewritten, by using the equation
－




K 丿 経 十 雨 十( Σ( べIT-=0＋
－T-1
司) －K) ＝Vi 十( Σ(cl 十 司) －K) ＝Vi 一 戸 ‾'T
 =0
So, the equality holds for the condition (4) in the first case.
－　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　－
Second, suppose that t ＜Tor 摩 ＞O where j ≠i.    As 5 converges to 1, LHS of the weakinequality














＞O in this case けhe strict inequality  holds for the condition ㈲for large <5  in the second
□
We next define a strategy profile s ＝(si ，S2)and a belief function profile p =  (pi，P2).Recall that
祠 べ|‰ が)represents the probability of choosing べ ≧O given 柘 ∈{H,L}  wid が ＝[x °,x＼
… ，x*
－i)with
x*－l ＞0.We also recall that Pi( が)represents the probability that agent  i assigns to the  eventwhere his opponent
is a high type given が.
To describe the strategies and the belief functions,  let us define the deviator d(が)as follows. Givena history 
が ＝(x °,x＼．‥，
ノ ‾i)with a:*‾ ̂＞0,  if a:'' ＝x" for all 7 ＝O,l,
‥. μ －l, then let d(が)=  0;
－
Otherwise,  let テbe the least 7 that satisfies ダ ≠ ダ.Note that テ ≦T  because otherwise,  the game
－114 －
Gradual accumulation of contributions under incomplete information
must end in period T.    Let d( が)=  m( チ).   If d(h') ＝III, then we say that がis on-path;  Otherwise,we say that 
がis  off-path. If がis off-path and l ≠d( が), then we call agent i the punisher. We notethat if 
がis off-path,  it must be the case that Z ≧2 because ん' is always on-path due to the fact thatx
° ＝x ° ＝K.
Strategy Si for i =  1,2.
Let  Vi G  {H,L}  and  が ＝(x °,x＼‥. ,x'－^)with x' －  ̂＞0 be given. By the feasibility for (c*i,4),we require that S,(O
＼Vr,が) ＝liii ≠Tn(t). When  i ＝m(i),  the following descriptions define Si(・＼Vi,が).The on
一path case. If  d(が)=  0けhen let Si( べ|‰ が) ＝l for c' ＝ べ.4
The deviator's case.　lii  ＝d(h*),  then we define Si(・皿 っが)as follows.
lix' ‾'≦PL 十(1  － ざ'^Wi，then let Si(c:|‰ が) ＝l for  c＼ ==ノ ‾・̂
ifx* ‾' ＞Pl 十(l －S^)Vi,  then let Si(c:＼Vi,が) ＝l for  べ ＝0.
The punisher's  case.　If がis off-path and i ≠d( が), then we define Si(・|Vi,が)as follows ・
lix* ‾'≦(1  － ざm ，then let s( ＼Vuが) ＝i for  c＼ ＝x' ‾i・
If (1 －5)Vi  ＜x' ‾ ̂<  L, then let Si(頑Vi, が) ＝l for  べ ＝0.
If z'－  ̂＞ £, then let 亀(ぺ貼, が) ＝l for c: ＝X* －' －L.
Note that in the deviator's case, RHS of the inequality satisfies the following conditions: For l/'; ＝ £,PL
十(1  － よ^)Vi =  L, and for n ＝H ，PL 十(1  － ぶ^)Vr ＞L ・
We also note that in order to define Si in the punisher's case with K ご 亙, we must have thecondition
 (1 －5)H  ＜L.  In fact, the condition is satisfied due to the condition (2)in Lemma l togetherwith the fact that 
乃 ＞0 ．
Belief function Pi  for  i ＝1,2.
Let  が ＝(x °,x-,‥.,x' －^)with X* －' ＞O be given. For  £＝1,  let pi(球) ＝ 乃and P2( 隠)=  Pi.For Z
≧2,  拓(が)is  defined as follows. If i ＝m(t  ― 1), then let 拓(帽 ＝ 拓(が ‾^).If i ＝rn(t),  then
拓(が)is defined in the following descriptions.
The on-path  case.　If d(が) ＝0,  then let 拓(が) ＝ 弓where j ≠i.
The deviator's case.　If i ＝d( が), then define  拓(が)as follows.
Ifx' ‾l≦(1  －6)H,  then let Pi(が)=  O・
If s'‾ ̂＞(1 －5)H,  then let Pr(が)= 弓where j ≠i.
''This expression implicitly states that Si( べ貼 ，が) ＝O for <=* ≠ べ
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The punisher's  case. If  がis off-path and i ≠d(/i'), then define Pi(h*)as followsIfx'
－i ≦L,  then let Pi(が) ＝1.
If x*－  ̂＞L,  then let Pi(が)=  0.
We now prove that (s, ）)satisfies sequential rationality in the series of lemmas. Take any i e{i ，2},Vi
 6  {H,L} パ ∈{1,2, ‥ 山and  が ＝(x °,x＼‥. ，x*
－^)with x* －l ＞0,
 and fix them for discussionof Lemmas 2 through 9. Let {(
ふ 弓)} ユhe the contribution sequence corresponding to h ＼．Whenwe consider a contribution
 sequence for period t and beyond, {(c{ ，略)}
瓦t ，we denote the combinedsequence
 by  c ＝{(cI,  弓)} 型o for notational  convenience.　We  assume  that c satisfies the feasibility,and we note that, by its construction, c is consistent with 
が.
Let  Si be agent  i's optimal strategy on condition that (sj,Vi,h ＼p)is given:
Si e  a.rgma.xui((s'i, Si)＼Vi, h＼p).
べ
We want to show that  Ui(s ＼Vi, が,p) ≧ 叫((亀 り) ＼Vi,がp)in exclusive cases
Lemma 2. When agent  i moves in the off-path case, that is, when,h* is off-path and i = m(t), and
ザジー^≦(l －5)Vi, then Ui(s＼Vi,h＼p)≧ル((砿り)|‰ が,p)for  all s-.
Proof・When  agent i follows Si, he chooses x'－i with probability one in period t regardless ofwhether he is the deviator or the punisher, and the game ends with his payoff







Let c ＝{( ふ 略} 型o be  such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability  distri-bution generated by
 拓(が)and  (瓦，句)given  が. We show that agent i's payoff  for c does not eχceed
陶 倒Vr,h
＼p)in exhaustive cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼V,，h＼p) ≧Ui((si,Sj) ＼Vi,がp).
If べ ≧X* ‾＼，then the game ends in period t  according to c, and we have
t-1
防(‰c) ＝S'－'(Vi一白 －Σ 訂－'-ご ≦ぷ－＼Vi－x'‾^)r=0





If c: くa;*－^，then the game continues with y ＝x' －' － c: according to c. In this case, the mostpreferred
 scenario for agent i is that agent j contributes all the  remaining amount y and completes
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the project in period (£＋1). Even if this scenario applies to c,
に ‰c) ＝~5'－＼m 一山 一Σ 訂-1に ≦-5'－＼呪－x' ‾')－Σ 訂－ べ̂‾＝≒(s＼‰ がp)
・r ＝0 T  ＝0
where the weak inequality holds since べ≧O and x'‾i≦(i －).　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □Lemma
3. When  agent i moves  as the pu万n万isher, that is, when i  －m(f) ≠d( が) －j,   and if(1
 －ざ)Vi ＜x* ‾^≦L, 仇■en U^(s＼‰ がp) ≧Ui((s'i,s.i)|Vi,が p)forall も
Proof・.When punisher i follows Si, he chooses  0 with probability one in period t and the gamecontinues with y 
＝x' ‾^≦L.   When deviator  j follows s,- given  が＋  ̂＝( が ノ) ，he chooses y withprobability one in period (i
 ＋1)as described in the deviator's case of the strategy, and the game ends.So,
Ui(s＼Vi,h＼p)＝5'Vi －Σ 訂-1ご




か.   We show that punisher i's payoff for c does not e χceed
叫(s ＼Vi，が,p)in  exhaustive  cases, which implies that  Ui(s＼Vi,h
＼p) ≧Ui((si,Sj) ＼Vi,h＼p).
li べ ≧ ノ ‾＼ then the game ends in period t according to c, and we have
t-1　　　　　　　　　(-1
呪(‰c) ＝~5'-＼Vi－べ)－Σ 訂-iご ＜~5凩 －Σ 訂-1に ＝馬岡玲 昿p)T-=0　
T = 0
where the strict inequality holds since (1  － ぶ)Vi ＜x' ‾'-≦cl
If c＼ ＜x^ －＼，the game continues with y ＝x' －i － c＼ ≦L  according to c.    Then, deviator  j inperiod
 (i ＋1)should let 弓＋1 ＝ ／as described in the deviator's  case of the strategy because otherwise,zero probability is assigned to c. So, according to c,
 the game ends in period (i ＋1),  and we have
t－1
に 霖c) ＝~5'‾' 圧 一 山 一Σ 訂 ‾1T
 ＝0
where the weak inequality holds since べ ≧0.
可
(-1




Lemma 4. When  agent i moves as the punisher, that is, when  i ＝m(t) ≠d( が)=  j, and ift'
‾i ＞L, thenui(s＼Vi,h＼p)≧佻((sしSj)皿,がp)for  all ぐ
Proof. In this case, Pi(が)=  0, so punisher i believes that deviator  j is a low type. When punisher ifollows Si, he chooses (x
‾1一句with probability one in period Z and the game continues with y ＝L.
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When deviator j follows Sj given が＋  ̂＝( がx') ，he chooses y with probability one in period ( £＋1)as described
in the deviator's  case of the strategy, and the game ends. So,  we have
t-1
Ui(s貼,h ＼p)＝S'‾＼ぷVi－(x'-' －L)) －Σ 訂一七T
 =0
Let c ＝{(cl ，c;)}^=o be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distributiongenerated by
 拓(
が)and  (瓦，妁)given  が.We show that punisher i's payoff for c does not e χceed
痢(絹/i，が,p)in  eχhaustive  cases, which implies that uds ＼Vi,h',p)≧ 桃((亀 町)|‰ がp).
If the project is not completed according to c, that is,  if Σ 仁o( 可 十 弓) ＜K ，then we have
U（̂呪c ）=
T　　　　　　t-1　　　　　　　　t-1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(-1
Σ 訂-' ぐ ーΣ 訂-' ご ≦O －Σ 訂-' ご ＜p- ＼5Vi
 －(K －L)) －
Σ 訂-' ぺT
 =t　　　　　T=0　　　　　　　　T  = 0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　T =0
t-1
≦6'- ＼ざ柘－(x' ‾'－L)) －Σ 即-'ご ＝≒(s貼,がp) ，T
 =0
where  the strict inequality on the first line is due to the condition (1)in Lemma 1, and the weakinequality on the
 second line holds since x*
－i ≦K.    So, in the remaining part of the proof of thelemma, we
 consider the cases where the project is completed according to c 。
We next show that c* ≧a;* ‾i －L.    If a;" ＞ £for any 7 ≧t,  then deviator  j, believed to be alow type, should let 
ぐ ＋1 ＝O in period (t  ＋1)as  described in the deviator's case of the
 strategybecause otherwise, zero probability is
assigned to c.    Since the project is completed according to cwhile deviator j never contributes as long as the remaining amount exceeds 
£, it must be the case thatpunisher
 i pays at least the difference between x' ‾' and L,  possibly  in one time or in  several times.If
 punisher i should  pay an amount no less than (a;* －i － £)in order to reach some remaining amountX,
 it is optimal for him to do so in one time, because deviator j's strategy does not depend on thepath from x'
－l to i but on the remaining amount i itself, and because delaying the completion of theproject lowers the discounted benefit. Therefore,
 we must have cj ≧x' ‾^－£。
If c*≧x' ‾＼，then the game ends in period Z according to c, and we have
に(/レ) ＝片 ＼Vi－べ)
t-1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　t-1
Σ 訂-'-好 ＜5'- ＼ぷVi－(x' ‾^一 句) －Σ 訂-'cl  ＝ ≒s ＼Vi,がp)T
 = 0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　T =0
where the strict inequality holds since cj ≧x' ‾^ and (1 －) ≦(l －d)H  ＜L ・
If x'－l ＞ ぺ ≧x" ‾ ̂－L,  the game continues with y ＝x' －^ － cS ≦L  according to c.    Then,deviator j in
period ( 乙＋1)should let c'- ＋'' =  x' as described in the deviator's case of the  strategy
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because otherwise,  zer〇probability is assigned to c. So,  the game ends in period (t  ＋1),  and we have
Ui(‰c) ＝5'‾＼ろVi一白




訂‾1可 ≦S'-^ ぶVi－(x'‾^一句) －






Lemma 5. When agent  i moves  as the deviator, that  is, when  i ＝m(t)=  d吋) ≠j,  and  ifVi =  Land
 (l－5)Vi くx' ‾i≦(1  －6)H,  then Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ≧Ui((s'i,Si)＼Vi,昿p)foralls'i.
We note that if  Vi =  H ，the condition that (1  －) くx' ‾'≦(1  －5)H  is vacuous.
Proof. In this case, Pi(h*) ＝0,  so deviator i believes that punisher j is a low type. When deviator ifollows
 Si, he chooses x' ‾i with probability one in period G
川 倒 £,/六 夕)こ が- ＼£ －x' ‾') ΣF
T =0
可
Let c ＝{( ふ 司) 抒=o be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distributiongenerated by
 拓(
が)and  (馬，町)given  が ．We
 show that deviator i's  payoff  for c does not  exceed
掲「s
」L,星,p)in
 eχhaustive  cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼L,h
＼p) ≧Ui((si,Sj)|L,h ＼p).
If the project is not completed according to c, that is,  if Σ 仁o( 弓 十 弓) ＜K,  then we have






≦　5'-i( £ －コヤ1) －
t-1













where the strict inequality on the first line holds since (l －5)H く £, and the weak inequality on thesecond
 line holds since  a:'‾^ ≦(1  －5)H.    So, in the remaining part of the proof of the leinma, weconsider the cases where the project is completed
 according to c.
We next show that  c ＼ ≧x' ‾ ̂－(1  －5)L ．　If a;"   ＞(1  －6)L  for any 7 ≧t,   then we have
ノ ≦ ノ ‾i≦(1  －5)H  ＜L,  and punisher
 ?', believed to be a low  type,  should let ぐ
＋1 ＝O in pe-riod
 (t  ＋1)as described in the punisher's case of the strategy because otherwise, zero probabilityis assigned to c. Since the project is completed according to c while punisher j never contributes as
－
long as the remaining amount exceeds (1  －5)L,  it must be the case that deviator i pays at least thedifference between 
ノ ‾' and (1 －5)L,
 possibly in one time or in several times. If deviator 八
an amount no less than (x' ‾i －(1  － ぷ)L)in order to reach some remaining amount X,  it is optimal for
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him to do so in one time, because punisher i's strategy does not depend on the path from X*  ‾ ̂ to Xbut
on the  remaining amount i itself,  and because  delaying the completion of the project lowers thediscounted benefit. Therefore,
 we must have  c
＼≧x' －  ̂－( －6)L.






ざ-^cl ≦6'- ＼£－xヶ') －Σ 訂-  c[ ＝Ui(s＼L,が,匪T
 =0
where the weak inequality holds since c: ≧x' ‾'。
If x'‾ ̂＞c ＼≧y 一1 － (1 －5)L,  the game continues with y =  x' ‾ ̂－c ＼ <(l － ざ)L accordingto c. Then, punisher j in
period (Z ＋1)should let 4+^  ＝x' as described in the punisher's case of thestrategy because
 otherwise, zero probability is assigned to c. So,  the game ends in period (i  ＋1),  andwe have
f-1
Ui(L,c) ＝5'- ＼ざ£－ぺ)－Σ: 訂-1ご ≦が-＼L －x' ‾')r=0
where the weak inequality holds since c ＼ ≧x｀i  －(1 －5)L.
i-1
Σ 訂 ‾ ご=  Ui(s＼L,昿 川T
 =0
□
Lemma 6. When agent i moves  as the deviator,  that is, when i　　m(t)　d(h') ≠j,   and  if(l
－S)H  ＜x' ‾ ̂<L,  thenui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ≧Ui((s'i,Sj)＼Vi，h＼p)for  all も
Proof・In this case, Pi(が)=  Pj, so deviator i believes that punisher j is a high type with probability
弓and a low type with probability (l －Pj). When deviator i follows Si, he chooses  a;' －^ with probabilityone in period t and the game ends
with his payoff
t－1
Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ＝ ぶ－'(Vi －x' ‾')－Σ 訂－‰l
T = 0
Let c ＝{( 広 略) 仁, be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distributiongenerated by
 拓(が)and  (糾，妁)given /i*.We show that deviator i's  payo 汀for c does not exceedUi(s
＼Vi,h＼p)in exhaustive cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ≧ 万((亀
妁)＼Vi，がp).






訂-^ ご ーΣ 訂-'^ご<0 －Σ 訂-' ご ≦ が- ＼Vi －:iヤ1) －Σ 訂-' ご ＝ 肩 巾 乙 昿p)T
 =0　　　　　　　・r=0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　T =0
where the second weak  inequality holds since y1 ≦L.  So, in the remaining part of the proof of the
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lemma,  we consider the cases where the project is completed according to c.
We next show that c: ≧x^ ‾ －̂(l－S)H.  lix^  ＞(l －ぶ)亙foranyT ≧t, then we have ダ ≦x' ‾'≦ 私and
punisher  j should let cド1 ＝0 in period (7 ＋1)as described in the punisher's case of the strategybecause
 otherwise,  zero  probability is assigned to c.    Since the project is completed according to c
－
while punisher j  never contributes as long as the remaining amount exceeds (1 一5)H,  it must be thecase that
 deviator i pays at least the  difference between  x'‾^ and (1 －5)H,  possibly in one time or inseveral times. If
 deviator  i should  pay an amount no less than (a;' ‾'－(l － ぶ)ii")in order to reach someremaining amount X,
 it is optimal for him to do so in  one  time, because  punisher J's strategy does notdepend on the path from 
ジ ー  ̂to
 X but on the remaining amount i itself, and because delaying thecompletion of the project
 lowers the discounted benefit. Therefore,  we must have べ ≧x' ‾'－̂(l －6)H.If
べ ≧a;*‾＼，then the game ends in period Z according to c, and we have
t-1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　t-1
呪( 玲c) ＝5' 一＼v. 一 山 一Σ 訂-1 ご ≦5'-'(V, －x' ‾')－Σ 訂 ‾'ご ＝ ≒(s 貼, がp) ，T
 = 0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　T  = 0
where the weak inequality holds since c: ≧x' ‾ 。̂
If I'‾i ＞c ＼≧x*- ‾ ̂－(1  －5)L ，the game continues with y ＝x' －  ̂－c*  <  (1  －S)L accordingto c. Then, punisher
 j should let (ヤ^ ＝x' in period (i  ＋1)as described in the punisher's  case of thestrategy because
 otherwise,  zero  probability is assigned to c. So,  the game ends in period (t  ＋1), andwe have









where the weak inequality holds since べ ≧a;'‾i －(1  －5)L  and /i ≧L.
Finally, we consider the  case where  x*‾'^ －(1  －5)L  ＞4 ≧x' ‾ ̂－(l －5)H.  In this case, the gamecontinues with
 X* G  ((1 －5)L,  (1 －5)H]  according to c. Then, punisher ?'  should  let either c*＋  ̂=  x*or
 弓＋1 ＝0 in period  (t ＋1)as described in the punisher's case of the strategy because otherwise, zeroprobability is assigned to c. We consider deviator i's expected payoff in this
 case.
If the event 弓＋1 =  x' occursけhen the game ends in period (t  ＋1)with deviator i's payoff
f-1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　t-1
Ui(Vi,c)＝5'一＼ざVi一白 －Σ 混一 好̂ ≦5'-U ぷVi十(1－ぷ)耳－y ‾1)－Σ 混-' ふ(call this value 呪r=0
T =0
where the weak inequality holds since べ≧x' ‾i －(1 －5)H  in the present case.
If the event 弓＋1＝O occurs, then the game continues with x'＋' ＝x' ≦(1 －5)H.  The results of
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Lemmas 2 and 5 show that deviator i's payoff does not exceed RHS of the weak inequality on the first





訂‾1ご ＝y-1( ぷ2(K－(y ‾1一雨卜 山 一









where the weak inequality on the second line holds since べ ≧a;゛i －(1  － ぷ)耳in the present case.
Since  拓(が) ＝Pj,  deviator i assigns probability Pj  to the event じ＋1 ＝X* and probability (1 ～ 弓)to
 the event  弓＋  ̂＝0.  So,  his eχpected payoff in the present case does not exceed
t-1
弓已 十(l －Pj)Ui     ＝5'- ＼弓(l －ぶ)坦 十ぶ'珀̂ 十ぷ呪 十(l －ぷ)(l－ぷ圃 －x'~'')－Σ 訂-' ごT
 =0
f-1
＜-5'- ＼V, －x' ‾')－Σ 訂 ‾'司 ＝Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p)r=0
where the strict inequality on the second line is due to the condition (2)in Lemma 1.　　　　　　　 □Lem
万ma 7. When agent|i|moves as the deviator バhat  is, when  i　m(t) －d( が) ≠j,  and  ifVi =  Hand
L くx* －i ≦ ぷl 十(l － ぷ'^)Vi，thenui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ≧M( 臨Sj) ＼Vi,昿p)for d も
We note that if K ＝ £, the  condition that £ くX* ‾'≦ ざ七 十(l －ざ')K, is vacuous.
Proof. When deviator i follows Si, he chooses X*-' with probability one in period Z and the game
ends with his payoff
t-1
Ui{s匪h ＼p)＝片 ＼＃－／∩ －Σ 訂-^dT
 = 0
Letc  ＝{( 妬 心)}型o be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distributiongenerated by
 拓(が)and  (馬，町)given  が.　We show that deviator i's  payoff  for c does not e χceedUi(s
＼耳,h!',p)in
 exhaustive  cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼H,h＼v) ≧Ui((si,Sj)|H, がp).
If the project is not completed according to c, that is,  if Σ 仁o( 可 十 略) ＜K,  then we have
Ui(H,c) エ ーΣ ダ ー'
t-1　　　　　　　　t-1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　f-1
好 一Σ 訂－'に ≦o －Σr －^d く ぷ-'( 耳 －x' ‾')－Σ 訂－'好̂ ＝Ui(s ＼H,h＼匪T=0
T =0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　T  = 0
where the strict inequality holds since x*－i ≦PL 十(l －F)H くH.  So, in the remaining part of theproof of the lemma, we consider the cases where
the project is completed according to c.
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If c＼ ＜a;*‾i － £, the game continues with y ＝ 丿 一 ̂－ べ ＞L  according to c. Then,  punisher Jin period 
け ＋1)should let ぐ＋1 ＝ 丿 一L  as described in the  punisher's case of the strategy becauseotherwise, zero probability is assigned to c. So,
 the game further continues with a;* ＋i ＝ £and deviator  imoves
 in period (t ＋2)according to c. For the continuation game after period (i  ＋2),it is optimal fordeviator i to follow Si by Lemma 6.
Hence,  deviator  i's eχpected payoff for c does not e χceed
Ui(s＼H,(h＼昿x* ＋''),p) ＝　抑 ＼耳 －x*＋')
t＋1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　t-1
Σ 訂-^ ご ＝~5''＋＼耳 一 句 －C に1 －Cl －Σ 即-' ご
t-1
≦s' ‾＼s^h － ざ七) －Σ 即 ‾ 司̂
T-=0
t-1
≦6' ‾＼耳 －x' ‾')－Σ 訂 ‾'ご= 剛S 賜 昿T
 = 0
p ）
where the weak inequality on the second  line holds since c* ≧O and c: ＋  ̂＝0,  and the weak inequalityon
 the third line holds since x'‾^≦ ぷL 十(1 － ぷ)H.
If ぺ ≧a;*‾ ̂－L,  then similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6 can show that deviator i'sexpected payoff
 for c does not eχceed Ui(s＼H,が,p).　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □Lemma
8. When  agent  i moves as the  deviator バhat  is, when  i =  m(t)  ＝d( が) ≠j,   and  ifx'
－i ＞ ぷl 十(l － ぶ^-)Vi，thenui(s ＼Vi,が,p) ≧Ui(( 昿Sj) ＼Vi, が,p)for
 all ぐ
Proof. When deviator i follows Si, he chooses O with probability one in period Z and the gamecontinues with y 
＝x* ‾ ̂＞L.  When punisher j follows 町given が＋i ＝(h ＼x'), he chooses (y － £)with
probability one in period (t  ＋1)as described in the punisher's  case  of the strategy. The gamefurther continues
 with x*
＋  ̂=  L,
 and deviator i, following Si given が
＋i =  (h＼£＼£'＋^)，chooses  L withprobability one
in period (t  ＋2)and the game ends. So,  we have
t-1
Uiis＼Vi,h＼p)＝片 ＼ざ呪 －ろ七) －Σ 訂-'ごT
 = 0
Letc ＝{( ふ 弓) をo be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distributiongenerated by
 拓(が)and  (恥，妁)given  が.   We show that deviator i's payoff  for c does not exceed
痢(s|呪 が,功in  eχhaustive  cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p) ≧ 佻((亀 り)|‰ がp).
If the project is not completed according to c ， that is, if Σ 仁o(cr  ＋ 弓) ＜ 瓦, then we have
T　　　　　t-1









訂 一1   T≦5*-'( ぷVi －？L) －Σ 訂-'c:  ＝Ui{s ＼‰h ＼p)
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where the second weak inequality holds since R ≧L.    So, in the remaining part of the proof of thelemma, we consider the cases where the project is completed according to c.
If c* ＜？ ‾' - L, then similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 7 can show that  x'＋ ̂＝£anddeviator
 i's eχpected payoff for c does not exceed







訂-' に ＝ ぶ＋＼V, － £)－cド'  －c ＼－Σ 訂' ごT
 = 0
≦ ぶ－^ぷ^Vi －5^L) －Σr －^c;＝剣s 匪h ≒p),
where the weak inequality on the second line holds since c'≧O and c ＋' ＝0 ，
If c*≧x* ‾ ̂－L,  then similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6 can show that deviator i'sexpected payo










where the weak inequality holds since x'‾' ＞Fl 十(1 －ぷ)V,．　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　口Lemma
 9. When  agent i moves  given an on一path history,硫,at is, when  i =  m(t) ≠J andd( が)=  0,then
 玖(s貼,が,p) ≧桃((砿 妁)皿 ，醜p)for  all も
Proof. When agent i follows Si, the game continues along h'＋̂  ̂＝(x °,z六‥・,xΥ). So, we have
－
T一
所s 貼 がp) ＝r 一風 － Σ 訂-' ご ＞0T
 = 0
where the strict inequality is due to the  condition  (3)of Lemina 1, evaluated at Z =  1 and Vi  ＝ 乙together
with the fact that c? ＝0.
Let c ＝{( ふ 司)}^=o be such that positive probability is assigned to c by the probability distri-bution generated by
 拓(
が)and  (恥，り)given hK We show that agent i's payoff  for c does not  eχceed
叫(s 貼 ，が,p)in  exhaustive  cases, which implies that Ui(s ＼Vi,球p) ≧ 馬((亀 り) 皿 丿
≒p).
－
If c[ ＝ 可for al レ ≦？けhen G こ ぐ for alレ ≦T  and hence c こ{( 庄 司)} 型o because otherwise,zero probability is assigned to c. It is obvious that
agent  i's payoff for c is Ui(s＼Vi,が,p). So,  we assumethat
 c.[≠cj  for some 7 ≦T  henceforth.
－
Let  テbe the least 7 that satisfies 好 ≠c[.Note that t ≦ テ≦T.  We also note that ぐ ＝cj for all7
≦ テー1 because otherwise, zero probability is assigned to c. Let  hテ＝(x  , ノ, … ，ダ ー^)denote the
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history corresponding to {( ふ 略)} 仁5. Agent i is the  deviator for hテ.
If the project is not completed according to c, agent i's payoff does not e χceed 0, which is less than
掲 国Vi,h*,p).   So, in the remaining part of the proof of the lemma, we  consider the  cases  where theproject is completed according to
c.
lix^ ‾ ̂－L ＞ct ≧0,  then similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 7 can show that ダ ＋' ＝ 工and
deviator i's eχpected payoff  for c does not exceed
Ui(s貼,(が≒ダ, ダ゛'),p) ＝　肘＋＼柘－ダベ)
－
く　 戸 一＼r ‾゛柘
－T
－
=  斤 凩 － ΣT=
テ
テ＋1
Σ 訂- ご ＝ ぷ- ＼ざ＼Vi － £))－c け' －4T
 =0
－T　　　　　　 テ一1
Σ 即 一回) － Σ 訂-' ごT=
テ　　　　　　T  =0
テー1











where the strict inequality on the second line is due to the condition (3)  in Lemma 1, evaluated att
 ＝ テけogether  with the  fact that 尋 ≧O and ご＋1 =  0.
”　　　八If ご ≧ ダ ペ ーL,  then similar arguments as in the  proof of Lemma 6 can show that deviator i'sexpected payoff






即-^ 可　 ≦　 討- ＼ 訂 ‾゛Vi
－T
－















Σ 訂-' ご ＝Ui(s ＼Vi,h＼p ）T
 = 0
where the weak inequality is due to the condition (4)in Lemma 1, evaluated at Z ＝T. □
Proposition 1. A  pair  (s,p)satisfies sequential  rationality.
Proof. Lemmas 2 through g show the result in e χhaustive cases.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □We
next prove that (s,p)satisfies  reasonability in the series of lemmas.    Take any i e  {1,2},t
 G  {1,2, ‥.}, and  が ＝(x ° ,ノ, ‥. ，x ‾̂^)with a;*－  ̂＞0,  and fix them for discussion of Lemmas 10through 13. Let
 7 ≠i and let {( ふcl)} ゴ)be the contribution sequence corresponding to が.   For
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which is well-defined only if M的 句(べ匪 的 ＞0OT(l －M 的)Sj( べ|L，的 ＞0・
Lemma 10. Suppose  that agent i moves  in|period t, that isバ　m(t).  Forx^　x'-'-(c ＼十ぺ) ＞0where
 (べ，べ)satisfies仇.e feasibility, we  have pf ((が,x^))＝拓((がx*))・
Proof.   Since i ＝m(t) ，the feasibility requires that -^ ＝O and sA 弓|凧 が) ＝Sj(4 ＼L,h')
pf(( が,x'))＝
拓(的




On the other hand,  Pi ((ft', 丿)) ＝Pi( が)by the definition of Pi( が＋^)in the case where t =  m(t).　 □Lemma
11. Suppose  that  agent  j moves  t向era  an  on 一path history /i*, that  is, j ＝m(t) ≠i andd(h*)
＝0.　For  x' =  ダ ーi －(c ＼十 白 ＞O where ( 乱 顔satisfies  the  feasibility丿i/p?(( が よ)) 仙well-defined,
 then p？((h ＼よ)) ＝M(h ＼x')).
Proof. If Pi㈲) り( 引 耳 が) ＞0 or (1  －pi( が))sj( 引L, 的 ＞0,  then  c*  ＝ もbecause other"wise,
句(
引 耳 め ＝ 町(顔Ly) ＝O. So,  if丿(( が,x'))is well-defined, then y ＝ ダ
‾^－(ぺ 十c ＼)ごx ＼.Since
句(
引H, が) こ 町(引 £丿)=  1 for d ＝ 昨we must have pf((h ＼x')) ＝
拓(が)=  Pi.    On the otherhand,
 拓((が, a;'))＝ 弓by the definition of  拓because i ＝m(t  ＋1)and the continued history ( が, ／)is
on-path ・　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □Lemma
12. Suppose  that  agent  j moves as  the  deviator バhat  is, j  ＝m(t)  ＝d( 的 ≠i.     ForX*
 =  x' ‾^づ べ 十 ぺ』＞0  where  (砿 旬satisfies  the feasibility, if 岬(( が,x'^))is
 well-defined, 仇,enp
グ((h＼x')) ＝p(h ＼よ)).
Proof・.First, suppose that x' ‾'≦L.  If Pi(が)sj(弓|H,h')  ＞0 or (l － 拓(h'))sj( 顔L,/i') ＞0,  thenc]
 =  a;'‾i because  otherwise, sj(づ|H ，吋) ＝s,( べ|L ，h')＝0.I 陽=
 x*
－＼，then y ＝O and the gameends in period t,sop^((h
＼x'))is vacuous 。
Second,  suppose that ／－' ＞L.  Since deviator j moves in period t given an off-path history h ＼ itmust
be the case that deviator j has deviated for the first time in period (i  －2)or before. So,  が－i isan
 ofF-path history. Since i =  77i(f －1)and  が
－  ̂is




－i)＝O by the definition of Pi in the punisher's
 case.  Hence,  拓(が)勺(べ|_ff，吋)=  0.  If
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(l － 拓(が))sj(白L,h*) ＞0,  then べ ＝0 because otherwise, り(d ＼L,h')＝O. Therefore,  if pf((が,x'))iswell-defined,
 then y ＝x' ‾^－(c{＋ ぺ) ＝x' ‾^ and pfm ≒必)) ＝0.0n the other hand, Pi((h ≒x'))=  0by
the definition of Pi in the punisher's  case because i ＝m(t  ＋1)and the continued  history (が, a;')isoff-path with y
＝x' べ ＞L.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □Lemma
13. Suppose  that agent ］moves  as the punisher,  that IS, j ＝m(t) ≠d( か)i. しForx'
 =  s'－i － (c{ 十 巾 ＞0  where  (べ,ぺ)satisfies 仇:e feasibility, if p?(( が, x*^))is well-defined, thenpf((h
＼ノ)) ＝pi((h ＼よ))
・
Proof. First, suppose that x* ‾i≦(l －ぷ)£. lipi( が)sj(弓 匪 的 ＞Oor(l － 削 が))sj(c'|£,帽 ＞0,then
 Cj- ＝X* ‾^ because otherwise, 町(
顔i?,/i') ＝s,( づ|L,泌)=  0.  If ^; ＝y －1， then y ＝O and thegame ends in period
t, sop が((/i≒a;*))is vacuous.
Second,  suppose  (1―S)L  ＜a;*‾ ̂<  (1－ぶ戸.  l叫( 的 り( 白H,h') ＞Oov(l －pi( が))sj(c]＼L,h*) ＞0,then we
have  either c] ＝ 丿 一1 or c] ＝0 because otherwise, り(c] ＼耳,が) ＝sA ぐ|L, 昆) ＝0,  If cj =  x'－＼then
y ＝O and the game ends in period t,sop グ((h＼x^))is vacuous. So,  we suppose that c*  ＝0,  andhence y
＝x' ‾'－(ぺ 十 ぺ) ＝a;'丿.Since Sj(c*|if,ft*)=  0, we must have pf((h ＼x')) こOiipf((h 卜 分))is well-defined.
0n the other hand, 拓(h ≒x*)) ＝o by the definition of  Pi in the deviator's case becausei
 ＝ra(t  ＋1)and  the continued  history (/i',a;')is off-path with y ＝x' ‾'≦(l － ぶ)H.
Finally, suppose that x' ‾ ̂＞( ＼－5)H.  li 拓(内 り 萌 匪 が) ＞Oor(1 一肩 が))り(引 £丿) ＞0,  thenc]
 =  max{0,  ／ ‾ ̂－ £} because  otherwise,  Sj(c)|H,  /i*)＝Sj(c)|L, 泌) ＝0 as described in the punisher'scase
 of the strategy.　So, ifp
グ(( ≒̂X*))is well-defined,  then y ＝x' 一1 － (c{ 十 べ) ＝mm{x' －＼L}.Since
 町(c'j＼H,吋) ＝s,(c*|L ホ') ＝1 for such c*-,  we must have pf((fe*,a:*)) ＝pi(h*).    Furthermore,
拓(が) ＝ 拓(が ‾')by the definition of Pi( が)in  the case where  i　m(t  －1).  If h'
－' is on-path, then
拓(が
－^)＝Pj.  If が ‾≒s





‾2≧a;*‾i ＞(l －S)H.  Therefore, pf(( がx')) こ 弓a  pf((が,x'))is well-defined. 0n the other hand,Pi((h
＼丿)) ＝ 弓hy the definition of  Pi in the deviator's
 case  because  i　m(t  ＋1)and the continuedhistory
 (/i≒a;*)is oflF-path with y ＝min{x'^ ‾≒L}  ＞(1 －5)H.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □Proposition
2.  A  pair  (s,p)satisfies  reason 山tility.
Proof・ Lemmas 10 through 13 show the result in e χhaustive cases.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 □By
Propositions l and 2, (s,p)is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  It is clear that the history マ ＋1is
realized along the equilibrium path. So,  the proof of the theorem is completed.
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4. Conclusion
We have investigated two-player contribution games that are similar to the  ones  studied by Compteand Jehiel [2003]but different in that our games
are played in incomplete information environments.
We have proved that, if the prior probabilities that each player should be a high type are bel  w  acertain
level, and if players are sufficiently patient, then there e χists a perfect Bayesian equilibriumin which step-by-step contributions are realized along the equilibrium path. Our result indicates thatuncertainties about
valuations of the opponent players can be a source of such gradualism.
Our  result can be improved at least in the following aspects. First,  it would be a better result if wedo not have to impose the upper-bound condition on the
prior probabilities. We regard this  conditionas a limitation of
 our result because the upper bound becomes lower as the difference between thevaluations of a high type and a low type becomes larger. Second, our analysis would be comprehensiveif we include the case where 
瓦 ≧2 £into the analysis. These are items on our research agenda.
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